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REDISCOVERING THE INDIVIDUAL IN
FEDERAL ELECTION LAW
I. Introduction
The contribution limitation provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)' have practical consequences signifi-
1. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (as amended by Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263; Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475; and
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat.
1339) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(3) (1976) (annual limit for individuals); id. § 441a(a)(8) (limitations apply
to earmarked contributions); id. § 441a(f) (prohibition of exceeding limitations); id. §
441(a)(2) (limitations on contributions by multi-candidate political committees); id.
§ 441a(a)(1) (limitations on contributions by persons); id. § 441g (limitations on
contributions of currency); id. § 441a(a)(6) (single limit for all Presidential elections
excluding general election); id. § 441a(a)(5) (single limit for committees established,
maintained or controlled by the same entity).
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court distinguished between
campaign contributions and expenditures, id. at 23, upholding restrictions on contri-
butions, while invalidating the restrictions on "independent expenditures." Id. at 58-
59. Significantly, FECA defines contributions to include expenditures made in sup-
port of a candidate at his request or with his cooperation, but to exclude
"independent expenditures" from its strictures. Compare 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(A),
441b(b)(2); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.8, 114.2-.7 with 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (Supp. V 1981); 11
C.F.R. § 100.16 (1982).
"Contribution or expenditure" is defined as including "any direct or indirect
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or any services or
anything of value . . . to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or
organization, in connection with any election ...... 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2) (1976).
Contribution is defined separately from expenditure. Id. § 431(8)(A) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). A contribution does not include, inter alia, volunteer work by an individual
without remuneration to a candidate or political committee, id. § 431(8)(B)(i); 11
C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(3) (1982), the use of private property or community facilities for
"candidate-related or political party related activities," and the cost of invitations,
food and beverages voluntarily provided by an individual for the event, 2 U.S.C. §
431(8)(B)(ii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(4)-(6) (1982), sale by a
vendor of food or beverage at cost to be used in a candidate's campaign or, by or on
behalf of, a political committee of a political party, 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(iii) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(7) (1982), payment made by an individual for
travel expenses of a candidate or on behalf of a political committee for which he is
not reimbursed, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (8)(B)(iv) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7
(b)(8) (1982), any payment or obligation by a corporation or labor organization that
would not constitute an expenditure under § 441b(b), 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(vi) (1976
& Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(10) (1982), any money or anything of value
given to a national or state committee of a political party earmarked to purchase or
construct an office facility which will not be used for federal electioneering purposes,
2 U.S.C. § 431 (8)(B)(viii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(12) (1982),
legal or accounting services rendered with certain restrictions, 2 U.S.C. §
431(8)(B)(ix) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(13) (1982), a state or local
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cantly alien to the principle of "one person, one vote" originally
envisioned by our founding fathers.2 These provisions, combined with
committee's payment of cost of campaign materials used in connection with volun-
teer activities provided that the restrictions specified are met, 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(x)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(15) (1982), costs of voter registration
and get-out-the-vote activities conducted by a state or local committee on behalf of
presidential and vice-presidential nominees provided the specified restrictions are
met, 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(17)
(1982), ballot access payments made or received, 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xiii) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(18) (1982), and any honorarium, 2 U.S.C. §
431(8)(B)(xiv) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(19) (1982).
An expenditure is defined in 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11
C.F.R. § 100.8(a) (1982), and does not include, inter alia, any news story, commen-
tary, or editorial that is not published under the control of a candidate, committee or
party, 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.8(b)(2)
(1982), nonpartisan activity designed to encourage individuals to vote or to register to
vote, 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(ii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.8(b)(3) (1982),
communications between a membership organization and its members, or a corpora-
tion and its shareholders or executive and administrative personnel, 2 U.S.C. §
431(9)(B)(iii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.8(b)(4) (1982), any payment
or obligation by a corporation or labor organization not considered an expenditure
under § 441b(b), 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(v) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. §
100.8(b)(11) (1982), an authorized committee or candidate's costs incurred in con-
nection with the solicitation of contributions, 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(vi) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.8(b)(21) (1982), the payment of compensation for legal or
accounting services with restriction, 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(vii) (1976 & Supp. V
1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.8(b)(14), (15) (1982), and costs of voter registration and get-
out-the-vote activities incurred by a state or local committee on behalf of presidential
and vice-presidential nominees, 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(ix) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11
C.F.R. § 100.8(b)(18) (1982).
Section 441b(b)(2) further emphasizes that "contribution or expenditure" does not
include (1) communications on any subject by a corporation or labor organization to
the members of its authorized class; (2) corporate and labor organization sponsored
nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns aimed at the authorized
class; and (3) "the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to
a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation,
labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without
capital stock." 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A)-(C) (1976).
2. Wright, Money and The Pollution of Politics: Is The First Amendment An
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 609 (1982); see Town of
Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259
(1977) (upholding provision that county charter must be approved by a referendum
election); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973) (invalidating reapportionment plan);
Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (invalidating the apportionment
of elections for school district trustees); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969)
(invalidating congressional districting plan based on lack of good faith in obtaining
mathematical precision); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Avery v. Mid-
land County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (requiring popularly elected county commissioners
exercising general governmental powers be districted according to population); Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (invalidating the apportionment of the Alabama
state legislature by creating the one person, one vote principle) (companion cases:
Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); WMCA, Inc.
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v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Maryland Comm. for Fair Represen-
tation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678
(1964) (Virginia); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) Delaware)); Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (congressional districts must be apportioned equally
based on art. I, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which "means that as nearly as
practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another's."); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (invalidating the county unit
system of nominating the governor and other officials in Georgia stating "all who
participate in the election are to have an equal vote- . . . whatever their occupa-
tion, whatever their income, and wherever their home ... "). These cases may best
be understood in the language of Gray, 372 U.S. at 381: "The conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to
the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can only mean one thing-
one person, one vote."
"Political equality is the cornerstone of American democracy," Wright, supra, at
625. Our government was founded and continues to exist because of the firm convic-
tion of Americans first proclaimed by Thomas Jefferson that "[w]e hold these truths
to be self-evident: that all men are created equal." The Delaration of Independence,
U.S., 1776.
Thus, political equality and freedom for the individual must be the overriding
concern of the legislature and courts with regard to federal election laws. Barriers to
complete political equality and freedom of the voter have been gradually abolished,
such as with regard to voting taxes, U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; sex discrimination,
id. amend. XV; age discrimination, id. amend. XXVI; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (Virginia poll tax for state elections invalidated
under the theory that "a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electoral standard."); literacy tests, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1976); see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131-34 (1970); residency
requirements, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89 (1965); party affiliations, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); racial restric-
tion, U.S. CONST. amend. XV; "white primary cases" Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); and physical access to polling places
for inmates of correctional facilities, O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974). Barri-
ers diluting the right to be a candidate have also been relaxed, such as wealth
restrictions, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972), property ownership requirements, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970),
racial classifications, Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), party affiliation,
McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317 (1976), and demonstrated support requirements,
Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Moore
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). However, in
recent years the injection of massive amounts of PAC wealth has created a new threat
to the citizen, and thus to the integrity of the political process. See Wertheimer, The
PAC Phenomenom in American Politics, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 603, 625 (1980).
While court decisions concerning FECA and its related predecessors have not
expressed the protection of the rights and powers of the individual as their purpose,
see note 56 infra, this must obviously be the overriding concern. FECA's predecessors
include: Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 36, 34 Stat. 864 (commonly known as the Tillman
Act, making money contributions by corporations and national banks to candidates
in a federal election illegal); Act of July 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 274, 36 Stat. 822
(making disclosure of finances by federal candidates following an election manda-
tory); Act of Aug. 19, 1911, 37 Stat. 25 (making preelection disclosure of finances by
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the need for immense funds to wage a political campaign, 3 force
candidates to overlook the individual citizen in the political process.
This unfortunate effect is not caused by the provisions themselves;
they were enacted to create incentives for candidates4 to seek input
and support from a greater number of individuals. 5 For instance,
Congress limited the amount of money that could be contributed by
any one individual." In addition, the Act prohibits direct contribu-
tions by corporations and labor organizations. 7 In so doing, Congress
hoped that candidates would seek support from more individuals
candidates for federal office mandatory); Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, tit.
III, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976)) (immediate predecessor
of FECA which extended the meaning of the term "corporate contribution" as
indicating only money to include "anything of value," and more importantly, made
the acceptance as well as the giving of a corporate contribution a crime); Second
Hatch Act, Pub, L. No. 753, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) (imposed the first restrictions on
union contributions and prohibited federal employees from participating actively in
political management or campaigns); Smith-Connally Act of 1943, ch. 144, § 9, 57
Stat. 167 (also known as the War Labor Disputes Act; enacted for the duration of
World War II to prohibit union contributions to federal campaigns completely);
Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (also known as the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act; expanded prohibitions on corporate and union political activity to include
"expenditures" in addition to "contributions"); see FEC v. National Right to Work
Comm., 103 S. Ct. 552, 560 (1982); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-84
(1957).
3. See H. ALEXANDER & J. MOLLOY, MODEL STATE STATUTE: POLITICS, ELECTIONS
AND PUBLIC OFFICE 15 (1974); Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financing of
Politics 22 ARIz. L. REV. 569, 570-82 (1980); Kenski, Running With and From the
PAC, 22 ARlz L. REV. 627, 628-29 (1980).
4. FECA defines a "candidate" as "an individual who seeks nomination for
election, or election, to a Federal office. ... 2 U.S.C. § 431(2),(18) (Supp. V 1981)
(definition of the term "clearly identified" with regard to a candidate). A group
organized to draft a particular person for candidacy to federal office is not a political
committee within the meaning of the Act, as no identifiable "candidate" is being
promoted. FEC v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F. 2d 380, 392-96
(D.C. Cir.) (a political committee organized to draft candidates, and not related to
any identified candidate, is not subject to FECA disclosure provisions), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 897 (1981). But see FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587,
595-96 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (rejecting draft committee's argument that the group is not
subject to FEC jurisdiction since it would not be considered a political committee
under FECA).
5. The Supreme Court has stated:
The overall effect of the Act's contribution ceilings is merely to require
candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number
of persons and to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts
greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political
expression, rather than to reduce the total amount of money potentially
available to promote political expression.
Buckey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976).
6. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (1976).
7. Id. § 441b(a).
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rather than from large corporate coffers, 8 thereby decreasing the po-
tential influence any one individual or corporation could have.9 Yet in
practice, candidates often ignore the individual contributor in favor of
organizations with large fundraising capabilities.' 0
The imbalance of campaign contributors is exacerbated by a provi-
sion in FECA which effectively offers candidates the alternate source
of financial support they desperately need. The Act permits a corpora-
tion or labor organization to create a separate segregated fund for
political purposes." This fund is administered by a political action
8. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960); FEC v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States
v. Chestnut, 394 F. Supp. 581, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd, 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.
1976).
9. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26, 38 (1976); Comment, The Constitu-
tionality of Restrictions on Individual Contributions to Candidates in Federal Elec-
tions, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1609, 1609-14 (1974).
10. Wright, supra note 2, at 615. Judge Wright states:
[Political action committees] are taking on growing importance in the
strategies of candidates and their fundraisers. They are rapidly becorhing
the dominant force among categories of contributors. The PAC compo-
nent of House candidates' campaign funds has risen steadily from 17 % in
1974 to 26.4% in 1980. And. PAC's have far outdistanced the federal
campaign funding contributions of all national, state, and local political
parties combined.
Id.; Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 580 (small individual contributions were in 1976
"only about thirty percent of the $300 million spent by those candidates and commit-
tees. [I]n congressional races, contributions of $100 or less averaged from thirty-four
percent of receipts in the campaigns of challengers, to forty-five percent in the
campaigns of Republican incumbents").
11. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976) (establishment, administration and solicita-
tions of contributions to a separate segregated fund); id. §441c(b) (a government
contractor may establish a separate segregated fund).
A separate segregated fund is a political committee under FECA, id. § 431(4)(B)
(Supp. V 1981), and may, without subjecting itself to the prohibitions on contribu-
tions and expenditures by corporations under § 441b, incorporate itself for liability
purposes. The treasurer of the PAC will, however, remain personally liable for the
performance of all duties. 11 C.F.R. § 114.12(a) (1982).
The term "separate" as used in FECA is synonymous with "segregated" and the
fund is not to be considered the sponsoring entity itself. Pipefitters Local Union No.
562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 422, 426 (1972). Also, a corporation or labor
organization may not attempt to circumvent FECA's restrictions by establishing and
maintaining numerous separate segregated funds. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (1976) (com-
monly referred to as the antiproliferation section); see Walther v. FEC, 468 F. Supp.
1235 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that two or more political action committees (PACs)
established, maintained and controlled by a single person should be considered a
single PAC under FECA, and thus the AFL-CIO PAC and PAC of its member unions
are to be treated as one); Note, Affiliation of Political Action Committees Under The
Antiproliferation Amendments To The FECA of 1971, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 713
(1980).
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committee (PAC) which is formed, controlled and financially sup-
ported by the corporation or union.12 Thus, the corporation and union
are able to do indirectly that which they could not do directly, further
obviating candidate dependence on individual support.
Part II of this Note discusses the Act's specific restrictions on indi-
vidual contributions and the relevant legislative intent. It will be
shown that instead of encouraging political candidates to look to a
greater number of individual contributors, the restrictions have in-
creased the importance of corporate PACs from which candidates
solicit and receive financial support. This part concludes by suggesting
that the campaign contribution limitations should be lifted to allow
greater candidate solicitation of individuals.
Part III examines the operation of the PAC system and its effect on
the diminished importance of the individual in the political process.
Assuming that PACs are a political force here to stay, part III proposes
to eradicate their undesirable by-products by lifting the restrictions on
the types of entities that may create a PAC and on the class of people
the PAC is authorized to solicit for contributions. This proposal forces
PACs to compete with each other for individual contributions, in part
by increasing the flow of information to the public, with the individ-
ual in the political system as the ultimate beneficiary.
II. Limitations on Individuals
A. The Existing Scheme
Section 441a of FECA, on its face, restricts individual political
participation. 13 It prohibits a "person" 14 from contributing to any
12. Walther v. FEC, 468 F. Supp. 1235, 1237-38 (D.D.C. 1979). See notes 61-62
infra and accompanying text.
13. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1976). Contributions to political candidates, committees
and parties are restricted, although contributions by individuals to a referendum vote
or election are not. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 450 U.S. 908
(1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Let's Help Florida v.
McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980). For a good discussion of campaign spending
and ballot measure campaigns, see Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot
Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment,
29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 505 (1982).
14. A "person" is defined as including "an individual, partnership, committee,
association, corporation, labor organization, or any other organization or group of
persons, but such term does not include the Federal Government . 2 U.S.C. §
431(11) (Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 100.10 (1982).
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candidate in a federal election 5 in excess of $1000.16 The ceilings on
total contributions by an individual to a national political party and
to any other political committee within any single year are $20,00017
and $500018 respectively. Also, in the aggregate, no individual can
contribute more than $25,000 directly to political candidates, their
authorized parties, any political committees or the national political
committee in any calendar year.' 9
The purpose of these restrictions on individual contributions is
threefold: to alleviate the possibility of actual or apparent corruption
caused by large contributions made by certain individuals; 20 to force
candidates to attain support from a broader base of individuals within
the community;21 and, to force individuals to participate actively in
the electoral process by making direct contributions and joining politi-
cal groups.22 These purposes are frustrated, however, by the practical
effects of the restrictions.
One consequence of FECA is that the restrictions apply to individ-
ual contributions but are inapplicable to the amount of money an
individual candidate may expend on his own behalf. 23 Hence, individ-
ual candidates of great personal or family wealth may expend unlim-
ited amounts on their own campaign support without soliciting nu-
merous small individual contributions. By contrast, a less affluent
candidate operates at a primary disadvantage in that he is forced to
spend time, money and effort simply trying to rally financial back-
15. "Election" is defined in 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.2(a), 100.8(b)(4)(v), 104.6(a)(1)-
(2) (1982). National banks, federally-chartered corporations and their respective
political action committees are subject to the Act's provisions for all elections. 2
U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976); 11 C.F.R. §§ 102.1(c), 114.2 (1982). A state-chartered bank
or corporation need only comply with FECA in connection with federal elections. 2
U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976). States concede that the federal election law supersedes state
law in federal matters, see, e.g., 1977 Op. N.Y. State Bd. of Elect. (Apr.18). If a
person or a political committee administering a separate segregated fund contributes
to federal, state and local elections, the expenses must be prorated in order to ensure
compliance with FECA, see, e.g., 1975 Op. N.Y. State Bd. of Elect. (Aug. 27).
16. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1976).
17. Id. §441a(a)(1)(B).
18. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
19. Id. § 441a(a)(3).
20. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976).
21. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
23. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court invalidated
restrictions on expenditures by candidates of their personal or family wealth in
support of their own election. Id. at 54. The Court found the governmental interest
in preventing actual or apparent corruption was insufficient to sustain expenditure
limits that were violative of first amendment rights. Id. at 53. See also note 25 infra
and accompanying text.
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ing.24 Hence, limits on individual contributions discriminate between
individual political candidates.2 5
A second consequence of FECA also serves to frustrate its purposes.
On the face of the statute, no ceiling exists on the amount of money a
PAC meeting the qualifications of a multicandidate political commit-
tee26 may contribute in the aggregate to political candidates, their
parties, political committees or a national political party. A PAC,
therefore, is expressly granted a greater voice in the political arena
through its unlimited contributions than is an individual. 27
Furthermore, candidates are not encouraged as a result of these
provisions to solicit contributions from a broader base of individuals
within the community. PACs may contribute $5000 per candidate in
any election, 28 whereas an individual may only contribute $1000 to
any candidate in an election. 29 Therefore, candidates who are able to
rally enough support from PACs have no need to expend much time
and effort soliciting considerably smaller contributions from many
more individuals. 30 Also, as one commentator has suggested, a candi-
date may have the leverage of influence in Congress as an added
24. See generally Adamany, supra note 3, at 581-82; Rhodes, In response to
Obey-Railsback, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 670, 671 (1980).
25. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he
ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates compet-
ing for elective office" was insufficient to justify expenditure restrictions violative of
first amendment rights. Id. at 54. This Note is not, however, arguing that expendi-
ture limitations be revived. Rather, it argues that restrictions on individual contribu-
tions should be lifted in order to provide the equalizing element between individual
and PAC contributions. See text accompanying notes 37-55 infra.
26. The qualifications are set forth in the definition of multicandidate political
committee:
[T]he term 'multicandidate political committee' means a political commit-
tee which has been registered under section 433 of this title for a period of
not less than 6 months, which has received contributions from more than
50 persons, and, except for any State political party organization, has
made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal office.
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4) (1976).
The FEC has recommended to Congress that this definition be changed in light of
the fact that no minimum contribution is specified. Because of this, a situation can
easily arise in which a committee contributes $1 to four candidates and is thereby
eligible to give $5000 to the fifth candidate. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ANNUAL
REPoRT 1979, at 38.
27. An individual's contributions in the aggregate in any calendar year may not
exceed $25,000. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
28. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1976).
29. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(A).
30. See Mayton, Politics, Money, Coercion, and the Problem With Corporate
PACs, 29 EMORY L.J. 375, 386 (1980).
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incentive to gain PAC funds31 which he would rarely have the oppor-
tunity to assert over an individual. Hence, it is more likely that a
candidate will rely mostly on PAC contributions and omit extensive
efforts to seek individual support.
FECA provisions regarding individual limitations also fail to de-
crease the potential for actual or apparent corruption. 32 The funds
obtained by a candidate or committee are still from a single source,
whether derived from an individual or a PAC. Although a PAC is
limited to some extent, it may still give five times the amount to a
candidate that an individual can contribute.3 3 PACs may also expend
unlimited amounts of money independently in support of a candi-
date. 34 Clearly the money and not the contributor is the potentially
corrupting influence.
Realistically, FECA individual contribution limitations are not the
incentive for political activism that the Supreme Court considered
them to be in the leading case of Buckley v. Valeo. 35 Perhaps the
reason that individuals have not become more politically active is that
they perceive the enormous strength and influence of corporate and
union PACs that have emerged in recent years. 36 The restrictions
placed on individual contributions therefore serve to diminish the
overall political involvement by the citizen.
31. Id. at 381-82; see also Adamany, supra note 3, at 572.
32. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976), the Supreme Court held that the intent of Congress to limit the mere appear-
ance of corruption was sufficient to justify the regulation of individual contributions.
The Court argued that despite limitations, individuals could still "assist to a limited
but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with
financial resources." Id. at 28. This was in light of the fact that individuals could
contribute to separate segregated funds. Id. at 28 & n.31. The Court, however, failed
to recognize that the appearance of corruption could just as readily be associated
with large corporate or union PAC contributions as with large individual contribu-
tions.
33. See Wright, supra note 2, at 621; notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
34. The Supreme Court invalidated restrictions on independent expenditures
made on behalf of candidates in a federal election. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51
(1976). For a definition of "independent expenditures," see 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (Supp.
V 1981); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.16, 109.1(a), 100.8(a)(3) (1982); see also Common Cause
v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (limits on independent expenditures made for the
benefit of a presidential candidate are prohibited by the first amendment).
35. See note 5 supra and accompanying text; Budde, The Practical Role of
Corporate PAC's in the Political Process, 22 Awz. L. REv. 555, 555-58 (1980).
36. See Mayton, supra note 30, at 386.
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B. Proposals for Restoring Political Power to the Individual
Although FECA allows individuals to make independent expendi-
tures without limit 37 and to volunteer personally to aid any political
candidate or committee, 38 the majority of Americans participate in
the political system solely through their individual money contribu-
tions to candidates and committees and of course, through their
votes. 39 Abolishing individual contribution restrictions is one way to
restore political power to the people.
One immediate effect of such an action can best be viewed in the
context of campaign financing for national party affiliated candidates
and independent candidates. In Anderson v. Federal Election Com-
mission,40 the appellant, an independent candidate for the presidency
in 1980, argued that sections of FECA were invalid because they favor
national political party candidates. 4' Under section 441a(a)(1)(B),
committees established and maintained by a national political party
may receive contributions not exceeding $20,000 from any single indi-
vidual. 42 A companion section, 441a(d)(1), allows a national political
party to expend these funds according to a statutory formula. 43 Thus,
the appellant claimed that in the November 1980 general election the
national committees could funnel up to $4.7 million to the party's
presidential candidate. A candidate not affiliated with a national
party, however, is limited to the $1000 contributions from individual
contributors .44 The appellant unsuccessfully requested a preliminary
injunction to permit him to accept up to $20,000 from each individ-
ual. 45 Although the First Circuit affirmed the denial of the injunction
37. See note 34 supra.
38. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(i) (Supp.V 1981) (services volunteered by individual);
id. § 431 (8)(B)(ii) (food, beverages and invitations volunteered as well as the use of
residential premises, church or community room for candidate party related activi-
ties); id. § 431(8)(B)(iv) (volunteering to pay travel expense of candidate for which
person is not reimbursed); id. § 431(8)(B)(x), (xi), (9) (B) (viii) (campaign materials
used in connection with volunteer activities).
39. See Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 590-602 (arguing, inter alia, that enor-
mous contributions by organizations create a strong disincentive to political partici-
pation by individuals).
40. 634 F. 2d 3 (1st Cir. 1980).
41. Id. at 3-4.
42. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B) (1976); 634 F.2d at 4.
43. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(1) (1976); 634 F.2d at 4 & n.3. This formula allows the
national committee of a political party to expend an amount equal to two cents
multiplied by the voting age population of the United States in connection with the
general election campaign of its Presidential candidate.
44. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)(A) (1976); 634 F.2d at 4 & n.4.
45. 634 F.2d at 5.
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because "the record [was] devoid of a factual basis" upon which the
constitutional claims could be assessed, 4 as a practical matter the
court was wary of granting the appellant's request two weeks before
the presidential election. 47 The fundraising disparity illustrated in
Anderson is a prime example of the inequities imposed by arbitrary
monetary limitations on individual contributions.
An alternative to outright abolition of the $1000 restriction would
be to allow individuals, unincorporated associations and partnerships
to contribute whatever amount they wish, but anything donated
above this $1000 limitation would be taxable to the candidate receiv-
ing the money. 4 This tax could support nonpartisan activities and
political communications by the government, thus broadening the
knowledge and interest of the general public in the political process. 49
Another possible recipient of the tax could be a public fund for federal
congressional and senatorial candidates in their elections. Through
this tax, public funding which is now available for presidential elec-
tions could be made available for all elections,50 thus equalizing the
chances of all candidates to succeed.5' Moreover, because individual
contributors from the general public would be funding elections,
individual influence on the political system would be more widely
felt.
Neither the elimination of restrictions on individual contributions
nor the tax on donations exceeding the $1000 limitations interfere
with FECA's purpose to alleviate corruption or the appearance of
corruption from politics.52 Existing disclosure requirements53 would
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See H. ALEXANDER & J. MOLLOY, supra note 3, at 7, 80 (§ 503(a)(b)).
49. Congress could then exercise its discretion as to whether these funds would
be used within that election itself or could be placed in a large fund to be used in all
elections.
50. Presently, public funding is available for presidential primary and general
election campaigns, and party nominating conventions. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9072; see
Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 852, 882-90 (1976); see, e.g., Anderson v. FEC, 634 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.
1980). Thus, PACs have directed their efforts and financial support to other elec-
tions. See Sorauf, Political Parties And Political Action Committees: Two Life Cy-
cles, 22 ARuz. L. REV. 445, 452 (1980).
51. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
53. 2 U.S.C. § 432(f)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (statements and reports by authorized
committees); id. § 432(f)(2) (statements and reports by a House or Senate candidate's
principal campaign committee); id. § 432(g)(1) (filing, statements and reports with
the Clerk of the House); id. §§ 43 2 (g)(4), 434(a)(4) (statements and reports by
nonauthorized committees); id. § 43 2 (g)(4) (filing, statements and reports with the
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force politicians to account to their opposing candidates, the govern-
ment and the public for any favors, especially in the case of large
donations. 54 Also, individual contributions would pose no greater
threat of corruption than do large contributions from corporate or
union PACs. Indeed, in situations involving a vote on economic pol-
icy, contributions from PACs supporting the voting representatives
may have more of a corruptive influence than in the case of an
individual whose contributions are less likely to influence a vote. 55
FEC); id. § 432(g)(2) (filing, statements and reports with the Secretary of the
Senate); id. §§ 432(g)(1),(2), 434(a)(2) (filing designations, statements and reports of
a House or Senate candidate); id. §§ 432(g)(4), 434(a)(3) (filing designation, state-
ments and reports by a presidential candidate); id. § 433(a) (organization's state-
ment); id. § 433(d)(1) (statement of termination); id. § 434(c)(2) (statement of
independent expenditures); id. § 434(a)(5) (postmark as of the date of filing); id. §
434(a)(6) (notice of contribution of $1000 or more that is received shortly before an
election must be given); id. § 434(a)(9) (filing date of special election reports); id. §
437 (convention financing reports); id. §§ 437(g)(b), 438(a)(7) (failure to file); id. §
439 (a)(1) (filing, statements and reports with state officials); id. § 434 (b) (contents
of reports); id. § 431(13) (definition of identification); id. § 438(a)(2) (FEC published
bookkeeping and reporting manual); id. § 434(a)(7) (cumulative reporting); id. §
434(b)(8) (debts); id. § 434(c)(3) (index of independent expenditures); id. §§
434(b)(6)(B)(iii), (c)(1)-(2) (reporting procedures in connection with independent
expenditures); id. § 438(a)(4) (restrictions on the use of information taken from
reports); id. §§ 432(g)(5), 438(a)(4), 439(b)(3) (availability of reports to the public);
id. § 438(a)(6)(B), (C) (index to reports and statements made by multicandidate
political committees); id. § 438(a)(4) (substitution of pseudonyms for the names of
contributors); id. § 434(a)(8),(9) (waivers of quarterly and special election reports);
id. § 438(a)(6)(A) (FEC requirement of index of designations, reports and state-
ments).
54. H. ALEXANDER & J. MOLLOY, supra note 3, at 7.
55. Kenski, supra note 3, at 639, 643; Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the
Federal Restrictions on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expendi-
tures, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 945, 991-95 (1980); Railsback, Congressional Responses to
Obey-Railsback, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 667, 668 (1980); see Wertheimer, supra note 2, at
611.
56. Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Polit-
ical Speech, 22 Aniz. L. REV. 373, 403 (1980) (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 43,380 (1971)(remarks of Sen. Hansen)). Political equality for all individuals is always the focus of
concern. See note 2 supra. Therefore, FECA's main objective must be to safeguard
the public's individual rights from corporations and labor organizations. See United
States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). In that case, the Supreme Court strongly stated
"[t]he evil at which Congress has struck in [the federal election laws] is the use of
corporation or union funds to influence the public at large to vote for a particular
candidate or a particular party." Id. at 589. The Court further noted "[a]s the
historical background of this statute indicates, its aim was not merely to prevent the
subversion of the integrity of the electoral process. Its underlying philosophy was to
sustain the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the
wise conduct of government." Id. at 575.
More explicit purposes concerning the campaign spending laws have been repeat-
edly articulated by courts and legislators. President Theodore Roosevelt, in his an-
nual message to Congress in 1904 and again in 1905, first expressed his fear of
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III. PAC Impact
A. The PAC System
The drafters of FECA sought to prevent those entitles that have the
capability to amass a huge store of wealth from using their general
funds "for active electioneering directed at the general public on
behalf of a candidate in a Federal election .... -5" Accordingly,
corporate wealth as a threat, not to the political candidate, but to the individual
voter. See Bolton, supra, at 375. The President delineated the two purposes of the
election laws:
All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any
political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be
permitted to use stockholders' money for such purposes; and, moreover, a
prohibition of this kind would be, as far as it went, an effective method of
stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.
UAW, 352 U.S. at 572 (1957) (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 96).
Protection of minority shareholders and members from decisions by corporate and
union officials to use general funds to support candidates and/or causes to which the
individual shareholder or member is opposed, is a purpose that has been seized upon
by many courts. The cases largely focused on whether or not the contributions by
members or shareholders comprising these general funds were given voluntarily for
the purposes for which they are used. See United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 761-
62 (D.C. Cir.) (Congress intended to protect individual union members against both
overtly coerced and unknown contributions: each is equally involuntary), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973); Pipefitters Local No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385,
413-14 (1972); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 592 (1957) ("[W]as the broad-
cast paid for out of the general dues of the union membership or may the funds b(
fairly said to have been obtained on a voluntary basis?"); United States v. Chestnut,
394 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 40, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1976); Barber
v. Gibbons, 367 F. Supp. 1102, 1103-04 (E.D. Mo. 1973); United States v. Anchor-
age Cent. Labor Council, 193 F. Supp. 504, 508 (D. Alaska 1961) ("[T]he purposes
of the statute ...are clearly expressed in these ...decisions, and in the debates
before Congress . . . . [S]econd, to protect the union member from having union
officials endorse candidates or attempt to influence voters which may be contrary to
the wishes of the individual member").
Other cases also evidence the protection of the dissenting union member. Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233-36 (1977) (government employees objecting
to union expenditure of compulsory service fees for ideological political purposes
were entitled to relief); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122
(1963) (denying the unions the power to use members' dues over their objection for
political purposes, and suggesting various remedies for the dissenting employee);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961) (holding that
unions were prohibited from using membership dues paid under a shop agreement
for political purposes over the objection of an employee). One commentator has
expressed doubt as to the continuing existence of this purpose in light of First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978), and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80-82
(1975). See Bolton, supra, at 413. But see FEC v. National Right to Work Comm.,
103 S. Ct. 552, 559 (1982) (stating in dicta that the purpose of FECA as protecting
the dissenting shareholder or member would be sufficient in itself to justify the
regulation).
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FECA prohibits corporations and unions from contributing directly to
candidates in a federal election. 57 Corporations and labor organiza-
tions, however, are permitted to amass a separate segregated fund for
political purposes. 58 This fund is administered by a political action
committee. 59
Campaign financing laws were also enacted to protect against actual corrupt
practices or the appearance of corrupt practices of legislators who may become
indebted to corporations and unions that have made large contributions to the
officials' support and benefit. Id.; First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26
(1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S.
567, 579 (1957); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 849-51 (2d Cir. 1974); FEC v.
Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 246-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. First Nat'l
Bank, 329 F. Supp. 1251, 1254 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
57. 2 U.S.C. §441b(a) (1976). A comprehensive set of provisions regulating cor-
porate and union political activity is included in the Act: id.§441b(a) (contributions
and expenditures by corporations, labor organizations and national banks); id.
§441b(b)(2) (definition of contributions and expenditures); id. §§ 431(8)(B)(vi),
(9)(B)(iii), (v) (Supp. V. 1981), 441b(b)(2)(A)-(C)(1976) (contribution/expenditure
exemptions); id. § 441a(a)(5) (limitations for affiliated separate segregated fund); id.
§ 441b(b)(7) (definition of executive/administrative personnel); id. §§ 441b(b)(1),
441c(c) (definition of a labor organization); id. § 441b(b)(3)-(6) (1976 & Supp. V.
1981) (solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund); id. §
441b(b)(4)(A)(ii),(5) (1976) (solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated
fund by a trade association); id. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) (solicitation of contributions to a
separate segregated fund by corporation); id. §441b(b)(6) (corporate solicitation
methods available to labor organization); id. §441b(b)(4)(B) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981)
(cross solicitation by corporations and labor organizations); id. §441b(b)(4)(C) (1976)
(solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund by membership organiza-
tions, cooperatives and corporations without capital stock from their members).
58, See note 11 supra and accompanying text; Budde, supra note 35, at 563-67
(analysis of the allowance for state PACs). Corporations and labor organizations also
possess the constitutional and statutory right to communicate with those affiliated
with them. U.S. CONST. amend. I; 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A) (1976); 11 C.F.R. §§
114.3-.4 (1982); see United States v. Congress of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 121
(1948), in which the Supreme Court stated:
If § 313 were construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and
unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of periodicals
advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage
to their interests from the adoption of measures, or the election to office of
men espousing such measures, the gravest doubt would arise in our minds
as to its constitutionality.
Corporations may also engage in other partisan and nonpartisan activities. 2
U.S.C. §441b(b)(2)(A) (1976); 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.3-.4 (1982). Partisan activities
include, but are not limited to: communications by a corporation or labor organiza-
tion to its authorized class, id. § 114.3(a); the distribution of printed material to the
authorized class provided it is produced at the expense of the corporation, labor
organization, or PAC of either, and is not the republication of material prepared by
the candidate or his committee, id. § 114.3(c)(1)(i), (ii); candidate or party repre-
sentative appearances at meetings, conventions or other regularly scheduled func-
tions of the corporation or labor organization provided that the meeting is held
primarily for other purposes, id. §114.3(c)(2); the candidate or party representative
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While general corporate or union treasury money may not be used
for direct contributions, 0 it may be used for the establishment, main-
tenance and solicitation of contributions to these separate segregated
funds.6 1 No restriction is placed on the amount of money a corporation
or labor organization may contribute for these support purposes.6 2 In
light of the fact that the amount of contributions solicited largely
depends upon the financing of the fund by the sponsoring entity,
appearing is permitted to solicit contributions from the authorized class at scheduled
functions, id.; telephone banks to urge the authorized class to register and/or vote for
a particular candidate or candidates, id. § 114.3(c)(3); registration and get-out-the-
vote drives, offering transportation and services to the authorized class to assist them
in registering and voting, as well as urging individuals to register with a particular
party and vote for a particular candidate or candidates, id. § 114.3(c)(4).
FECA also permits corporations and labor organizations to engage in nonpartisan
activity. Id. § 114.4. Nonpartisan communications on any subject, registration, and
get-out-the-vote drives are freely permitted if made by the corporation or labor
organization and directed at members of the authorized class, id. § 114.4(a)(1), (2).
The regulations are more restrictive, however, with regard to nonpartisan activities
aimed at employees in addition to the authorized class. Such activities include:
appearances by candidate and party representatives on corporate premises, id. §
114.4(b)(1), with restrictions set forth in (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and on union prem-
ises, id. § 114.4(b)(2), with restrictions set forth in id. §§ 114.4(b)(1)(i)-(iii),
114.4(b)(2)(i)-(ii); registration and voting information communicated by posters,
newsletters and other means, id. § 114.4(c)(1), with restrictions set forth in (i), (ii).
This allows a corporation or labor organization to distribute or reprint any instruc-
tional materials produced by the official election administrators, id. § 114.4(c)(2),
and voter guides and brochures describing candidates and their positions, id. §
114.4(c)(3), with restrictions set forth in (i), (ii); registration and get-out-the-vote
drives, offering assistance in transportation, id. § 114.4(d), with restrictions set forth
in (i), (ii); the donation of funds to civic and other nonprofit organizations for
registration and get-out-the vote drives, id. § 114.4(d)(2); and the utilization of
corporate and union employees and facilities by the civic or nonprofit corporation to
conduct these activities, id. § 114.4(d)(3). See Sproul, Corporations and Unions in
Federal Politics: A Practical Approach to Federal Election Law Compliance, 22
Aruz. L. REV. 465, 475-77 (1980). However, not only does FECA fail to encourage
corporations and unions to sponsor nonpartisan political activities, it actually deters
them. Section 441b(b)(2)(C) has been construed as restricting corporate and union
unilateral participation unless the nonpartisan activity is "co-sponsored with and
conducted by an organization which does not support or endorse candidates or
political parties." FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 1979, at 39.
59. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
60. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (a) (1976).
61. Id. § 441b(b)(2)(C); see Nicholson, supra note 55, at 952.
62. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976). Also, if the PAC expends its own funds
for its establishment, maintenance, and solicitation of contributions to it, the corpo-
ration or labor organization may reimburse the PAC for the expenditures made by it
for these purposes. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 1976, Advisory
Op. No. 1976-111; FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 1979, Advisory
Op. No. 1979-33.
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FECA hardly restricts overall corporate and union contributions at
all.
Moreover, PAC contributors for political purposes in the aggregate
are unrestricted. The ultimate control of the fund is vested in a small
group of managers or officers of the corporation or union with no
contributor input into decisions as to expenditure of funds.6 3 The Act
provides that the intended use of the funds must be stated in solicita-
tions to employees; however, the recipients of the funds do not have to
be identified.14 FECA also affirmatively proscribes coercive tactics by
PACs in soliciting contributions.6 5
Under the statute, only corporations and labor organizations, as
opposed to entities such as unincorporated associations, partnerships
and investment groups, are permitted to create PACs."6 Solicitation of
63. The Supreme Court, in Pipefitters Local No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S.
385 (1972), supported this control by corporate or union management, stating "[n]o-
where . . . has Congress required that the political organization (PAC) be formally
or functionally independent of union control or that union officials be barred from
soliciting contributions or even precluded from determining how the monies raised
will be spent." Id. at 415; see also 41 Fed. Reg. 35, 968 (1976), where the FEC
specifically allows a sponsoring entity to exercise control over the fund.
One advocate of the PAC system has recognized that PACs concentrate their
efforts on increasing contributions and expending their funds, rather than on foster-
ing member participation and knowledge. PACs do not enable their members to be
"an essential component of effective campaigns." Elliott, Political Action Commit-
tees-Precincts of the 80's, 22 Amz. L. REv. 539, 552-54 (1980).
64. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(B) (1976) (no specification that the information con-
cerning the intended use of the funds contain the names of recipients); see also id. §
441b(b)(3)(C) (employees must be informed of their right of refusal at the time of
their solicitation). According to the regulations, members as well as employees must
be informed of the purposes of the fund and their right of refusal at the time of their
solicitation. No statutory basis exists for this inclusion of members in the regulations.
11 C.F.R. § 114.5(a)(3) (1982).
65. Section 441b prohibits PACs from coercing persons to contribute to them by
using:
money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination,
financial reprisals, or the threat of force, job discrimination, or financial
reprisal; or by dues, fees, or other moneys required as a condition of
membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment, or
by moneys obtained in any commercial transaction. ...
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(A) (1976). An employee must be informed of his right to refuse
without fear of reprisal. Id. § 441b(b)(3)(C). The regulations also prohibit PACs
from obtaining contributions through "reverse checkoffs," meaning that an amount
is deducted by an employer from an employee's paycheck unless the employee
requests a refund. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(a) (1982); see FEC v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457
F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that a reverse checkoff system requiring
a member to act to prevent contribution violated FECA).
66. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976) (allowing corporations, labor organizations,
membership organizations, cooperatives and corporations without capital stock to
establish separate segregated funds). For clarification of the distinction between a
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funds by the PAC is limited to people who belong to the "authorized
class"; 7 this class can include members, 8 shareholders,"" executive
and administrative personnel, 70 the families of each of these individ-
nonprofit organization and a cooperative, see Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Cor-
poration Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 508 (1981).
67. For purposes of this Note, those persons whom a corporation or labor organi-
zation may legally solicit for contributions to its PAC are referred to as members of
the authorized class. A corporation's authorized class includes its stockholders and
their families, and executive and administrative personnel and their families. 2
U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A) (1976); 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(g)(1) (1982). Twice a year a
corporation may in writing solicit its employees. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 114.6 (1982). A labor organization may solicit contribu-
tions to its PAC from its members and their families. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A)
(1976); 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(g)(2) (1982). Twice a year it may solicit, in writing,
contributions from shareholders, executive and administrative personnel, and nonun-
ion employees. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 114.6
(1982). This allowance for twice a year solicitation of corporate and union employees
resulted from the Sun Oil Advisory Opinion, FEC Ad. Op. 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg.
56,584 (1975), in which the FEC stated that it would allow corporations and labor
organizations to solicit contributions to their PACs from employees. In response to
this opinion, Congress in its 1976 Amendments to FECA, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90
Stat. 475 (1976), limited solicitation of employees to twice a year, although solicita-
tion of executive and administrative personnel and their families is still permitted
without restriction. A membership organization, cooperative or corporation without
capital stock is limited to solicitation of its members. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(C)
(1976). Solicitation of families is not permitted as no provision enabling such action is
contained in the statute. See id.
68. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A) (1976) (members of a labor organization); id. §
441b(b)(4)(c) (members of a membership organization, cooperative or corporation
without capital stock). The regulations state:
"Members" means all persons who are currently satisfying the require-
ments for membership in a membership organization, trade association,
cooperative, or corporation without capital stock and in the.case of a labor
organization, persons who are currently satisfying the requirements for
membership in a local, national, or international labor organization.
Members of a local union are considered to be members of any national or
international union of which the local union is a part and of any federa-
tion with which the local, national, or international union is affiliated. A
person is not considered a member under this definition if the only require-
ment for membership is a contribution to a separate segregated fund.
11 C.F.R. §§ 100.8(b)(4)(iv), 114.1(e) (1982). See FEC v. National Right to Work
Comm., 103 S. Ct. 552 (1982); notes 99-102 infra and accompanying text.
69. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(B) (1976); id. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(twice a year solicitation by labor organization of shareholders of its member-organi-
zation). No definition of a shareholder is given within FECA, except that the Confer-
ence Report states that "the normal concepts of corporate law shall be controlling."
H.R. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1976). But this vague statement of
intention without a clear definition has raised significant problems. See Sproul, supra
note 58. But see 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(h) which sets three requirements in order for a
person to be considered a stockholder: (1) a "vested beneficial interest in stock"; (2)
the power to direct how the stock shall be voted, if it is voting stock and (3) the right
to receive dividends. Id.
70. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A) (1976); id. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(twice a year solicitation of executive and administrative personnel of member corpo-
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uals, 7' and occasionally lower-level employees. 72 These creation and
solicitation restrictions have significantly decreased the individual's
role in the political process.
B. Problems with the PAC System and Infringement of Individual
Rights
The injection of PAC funds and influence in the political process 73
creates unforeseen barriers to individual political equality and dimin-
ishes the individual's importance. The most obvious cause of this
inequality between individual and PAC contributors is that no ceiling
exists on the amount of money a PAC meeting the qualifications of a
political committee74 may contribute in the aggregate to political
candidates, their parties, political committees or a national political
party. This gives unlimited power to management or top officials of a
corporation or union who retain control over PAC spending. 75 Hence,
the statute distinguishes for the purposes of contribution limitations
between a single individual and a small group of individuals with the
cloak of management. Also, since restrictions on individuals contribu-
tions exceed those of a PAC, a candidate is more likely to concentrate
his efforts on attaining support from PACs, thus ignoring the individ-
ual .76
rations by a labor organization. Section 441b(b)(7) defines "executive and adminis-
trative personnel" as "individuals employed by a corporation who are paid on a
salary, rather than an hourly, basis and who have policymaking, managerial, profes-
sional, or supervisory responsibilities." Id. § 441b(b)(7) (1976); 11 C.F.R. §
100.8(b)(4)(iii) (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976).
The Conference Report accompanying the 1976 Amendments stated:
The term 'executive or administrative personnel' is intended to include the
individuals who run the corporation's business, such as officers, other
executives, and plant, division, and section managers, as well as individ-
uals following the recognized professions, such as lawyers and engineers,
who have not chosen to separate themselves from management by choos-
ing a bargaining representative; but is not intended to include profession-
als who are members of a labor organization, or foremen who have direct
supervision over hourly employees, or other lower level supervisors such as
'straw-bosses.'
Id; 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(c) (1982) (definition of "executive or administrative person-
nel").
71. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A) (1976).
72. Id. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1976 & Supp V 1981).
73. See notes 77-80 infra and accompanying text.
74. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
76. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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Moreover, PACs wield great power within the political process. 77
They have the potential to influence Congressional voting; non-voting
political decisions concerning principles and policies of our electorate;
a candidate's chance for success in an election; and, most importantly,
what information the public and the individual as a member of the
public has regarding the political process. 78 PACs are drawn into the
political arena as a result of their interest in such areas as taxation,
economic policy and governmental regulations.7 9 Their demonstrated
success in achieving their objectives through the recipients of their
contributions causes the individual citizen to question the integrity of
the political process, and thus take a more apathetic attitude toward
it. 80
Appearances of corruption are further aggravated by the strong
tendency of PACs to direct their funds largely toward the reelection of
incumbents, who in the view of the corporation or union, may have
more power and be of greater assistance in the political realm than
may a newcomer. Consequently, PAC contributions are not made as a
result of any particular ideological slant. 8' Given this predisposition
toward incumbents as a result of self-interest, as well as the PAC's
sparse dissemination of information concerning the recipients of the
fund to the individual contributor, 82 FECA provisions and court deci-
sions attempting to enforce the knowing and voluntary character of
contributions to PACs 83 appear illusory. Hence, free choice of the
77. Alexander, The Obey-Railsback Bill: Its Genesis and Early History, 22 Aruz.
L. REv. 653, 657 (1980); Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 611-16; Wright, supra note 2,
at 616.
78. Kenski, supra note 3, at 643-44; Railsback, supra note 55, at 668.
79. Wright, supra note 2, at 616.
80. Railsback, supra note 55, at 668; Wright, supra note 2, at 625.
81. Adamany, supra note 3, at 590-91 ("PAC contributing strategies do not,
therefore, hold promise of revitalizing competition and thus accountability in elec-
torally non-competitive districts where political opposition already suffers severe
financial deprivation"). Id. at 591; Mayton, supra note 30, at 381 ("Corporate PACs
tend to be nonidealogical. The author of a 1932 work called Money in Elections
noted that there was a 'complete divorce of such (corporate) contributions from any
question of policy' and that the corporation simply backed those likely to gain office-
usually the incumbents"); Sorauf, supra note 50, at 452-53 ("By pursuing a legislative
strategy, of course, PAC's ruled out a strategy of supporting candidates on the basis
of party or issue positions . . . . PAC's contributed to candidates, especially incum-
bent candidates, of both parties"); Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 609-11 ("PAC
contributions can be viewed as investments by special interests in Congressional
decisionmaking. This can be seen clearly in the fact that PAC's strongly favor
incumbents over their challengers, regardless of party"). Id. at 609.
82. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
83. See Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414
(1972) (holding that solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund
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individual to contribute to PACs is insignificant as it is stripped of any
real input and ideas.
Furthermore, judicial safeguards of individual rights under the
present statutory scheme allowing for these powerful and influential
PACs are also inadequate. In Cort v. Ash,84 the Supreme Court held
that an individual has no private civil cause of action for violations of
FECA. s5 An individual is limited to filing a complaint with the Fed-
eral Election Commission86 (FEC) which will then pursue it to the
"[m]ust be conducted under circumstances plainly indicating that donations are for a
political purpose and that those solicited may decline to contribute without loss of
job, union membership, or any other reprisal within the union's institutional
power."); United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 760-64 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1076 (1973).
84. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For an analysis of this case, see Smith, Business, Buck$ &
Bull: The Corporation, The First Amendment & The Corrupt Practices Law, 4 DEL.
J. CoRP. LAw 39, 97-98 (1978); cf. Note, Curbing Corporate Campaign Contribu-
tions: Implying a Civil Action From the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 18 U.S.C. §
610, 63 CEo. L.J. 1159 (1975).
85. 422 U.S. at 77-85. See also Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633
F.2d 393, 395-96 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing the four considerations as to whether a
private right of action is implicit in a statute not explicitly providing for one as
identified by the Supreme Court in Cort.
86. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). In the 1974 Amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Congress established the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) to enforce the federal election laws. Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 208, 88 Stat. 1279 (current version at
2 U.S.C. § 437c (Supp. V 1981)). Previously, the election laws had rarely been
enforced by the Department of Justice assisted by various "supervisory officers"
empowered with this responsibility. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-225 §8 301, 309, 86 Stat. 12, 18 (repealed 1974). See Note, supra note 84, at
1159-60. As a reaction to the Nixon campaign practices, the Weed Scott Report, and
the Watergate scandals, the FEC was created in 1974 to alleviate this lack of
enforcement. See Mayton, supra note 30, at 375-82; Smith, supra note 84, at 41-43;
Wright, supra note 2, at 610. The sole interruption in the FEC's existence occurred
with the ruling of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), that as initially constituted,
the Commission was unconstitutional and therefore precluded from asserting any
enforcement or rulemaking authority. Id. at 137-41. Past acts of the Commission
were accorded de facto validity, id. at 142, and the statute was subsequently
amended to comply with constitutional standards. The President now appoints six
voting members whom the Senate must then confirm. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (Supp. V
1981).
The FEC has primary and exclusive jurisdiction in all civil enforcement matters,
id. §§ 437c(b)(1), 437d(e), while the Attorney General of the United States prosecutes
all criminal violations. Id. § 437g(c). See, e.g., United States v. Tonry, 433 F. Supp.
620, 623 (E.D. La. 1977); United States v. Jackson, 433 F. Supp. 239, 241
(W.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 586 F.2d 832 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1978).
If the violation has been knowing and willful, the Commission will refer the case to
the Attorney General. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (Supp. V 1981). See Note, supra note 84, at
1163-64; Baran, The Federal Election Commission: A Guide for Corporate Counsel,
22 ARiz. L. REV. 519, 530-31 (1980).
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extent the agency deems appropriate. 87 FECA's expedited review pro-
vision, section 437h of Title 2 of the United States Code,8 is also an
inadequate protection of individual constitutional rights. Section 437h
provides that the FEC, the National Committee of any political party
or an individual eligible to vote in a Presidential election may institute
an action in the district court in order to challenge "the constitutional-
ity of any provision of this Act." ' However, in light of procedural
shortfalls of section 437h,90 constitutional justiciability requirements 1
In addition to enforcement proceedings, 2 U.S.C. § 437g (Supp. V 1981), the most
important power that the FEC exercises is its issuance of advisory opinions, id. §
437d(a)(7), concerning specific application of FECA to a set of facts, id. § 437f
(a) (1),(b), at the request of any person, id. § 437f(a). A person relying on an advisory
opinion and acting upon it in good faith is immune from any sanction that could be
levied as a result of the Act, id. § 437f(c); 11 C.F.R. § 112.5(b)(1982).
87. A written, signed, sworn, notarized complaint may be filed with the FEC by
any person, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 111.4 (1982), under
penalty of perjury, id. The FEC will then investigate the complaint, 2 U.S.C. §§
437d(a)(9), 437g(a)(2), 438(b). If the Commission finds reason to believe that a
violation of FECA has or will occur, id. § 437g(a)(2),(a)(4)(A)(i), it will then make
an attempt at conciliation with the violator, id. § 437g(a)(4)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 111.18.
Four members of the Commission must vote affirmatively on the "reason to believe
finding" in order to pursue the alleged violation. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2)(Supp. V
1981); 11 C.F.R. §§ 111.9, 111.10 (1982). Successful conciliatory efforts are binding
and no further redress on the identical violations may be taken. 2 U.S.C. §
437g(a)(4)(A)(i)(Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 111.9 (1982). See also FEC v. Illinois
Medical Political Action Comm., 503 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (successful concili-
ation agreement also results in dissolution of protective order imposed on the FEC
prohibiting it from disclosing documents received by the violator during the investi-
gation).
At no point during the investigation is the individual complainant informed of the
status of the case, nor does he take an active role unless the FEC dismisses it without
taking action or fails to act on it within 120 days of filing. 2 U.S.C. §
437g(a)(8)(A)(Supp. V 1981). If the FEC acted incorrectly, the court will require it
to take the specified action within thirty days. Id. § 437g(a)(8)(C). Upon refusal of
the FEC to take this action, the individual may institute a private civil action for the
violation involved in the original complaint. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the
machinations of the FEC, see generally Baran, supra note 86; Note, The Federal
Election Commission, The First Amendment, and Due Process, 89 YALE L.J. 1199
(1980).
88. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (Supp. V 1981).
89. Id. § 437h(a). It further provides that the single-judge district court shall
immediately certify all constitutional questions to the court of appeals sitting en
banc. Id. Direct appeal to the Supreme Court is available upon a final decision of the
court of appeals. Id. § 437h(b)(1976). Furthermore, the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court must "advance on the docket and . .. expedite to the greatest
possible extent the disposition of any matter certified .. ." Id. § 437h(c).
90. Ambiguities exist between judicial review provisions of FECA and the Presi-
dential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9042 (1976). The latter Act
requires that all constitutional questions arising under it be heard by a three-judge
district court. Id. §8 9010(c), 9011(2). This conflicts with § 437h's requirement that
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and self-imposed prudential rules,9 2 the ability of voters to have their
claims adjudicated is questionable under this provision.
all constitutional questions be certified immediately by a district court judge to the
court of appeals sitting en banc. 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (Supp. V 1981); see, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1976). The Supreme Court in that case noted the
jurisdictional ambiguities but refused to pass on them because the lower courts had
already simultaneously heard the case in both a court of appeals sitting en bane and a
three-judge district court. Id. at 9 n.6; see also Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487
F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), questions answered, 616 F.2d 1, 1-2 (2d Cir. 1980) (follow-
ing the procedure of Buckley but varying it somewhat by prescribing that a single
judge district court and a three-judge district court would make their findings before,
rather than after, a remand by the court of appeals).
A second procedural shortfall is the requirement in § 437h that the court of appeals
sit en bane. 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (Supp. V 1981). Doubt as to the meaning and
constitutionality of this requirement has caused courts to hear cases instead under
FED. R. APP. P. 35. See FEC v. Lance, 635 F.2d 1132, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981);
California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 641 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir.), af'd, 453 U.S. 182
(1981).
Conflicts between the FEC's enforcement power under 2 U.S.C. §§ 437g, 437h
(Supp. V 1981), have plagued the Commission and the courts. FECA provides that §
43 7 g actions instituted by the FEC be advanced on the docket and heard ahead of all
other actions, except those brought under § 437h. Id. § 43 7g(1O). The Act fails to
provide any means to consolidate the enforcement proceedings under § 437g and the
special expedited review offered by § 437h. This failure is particularly burdensome in
light of the fact that § 437h may be applied by way of a counterclaim. See FEC v.
Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir.
1980). Therefore, when the FEC institutes an action pursuant to § 437g in the district
court, the respondent may counterclaim under § 437h and have the action advanced
on the docket ahead of the § 437g proceeding and immediately certified to the court
of appeals en bane. In effect, trials containing identical issues and facts can proceed
simultaneously in two separate courts. California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S.
182, 205-06 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Powell & Rehnquist,
JJ.). The Supreme Court in California Medical split in a 4-1-4 vote over the issue of
jurisdiction under § 437h. The dissent detailed the inefficiency and waste suffered by
the courts and the FEC under the judicial review provisions of FECA. Id.
The FEC has repeatedly recommended to Congress that the discrepancies between
the various judicial review provisions be alleviated. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
ANNUAL REPORT 1980, at 7; FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 1979,
at 41; FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 45.
91. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976) (noting the requirement that a
justiciable case or controversy must exist in all actions, including those brought under
2 U.S.C. § 437h). The requirement of § 437h that the constitutional questions be
certified immediately to the court of appeals creates a greater possibility that there
will be an insufficient factual basis upon which to determine if a case or controversy
exists. See Martin Tractor Co. v. FEC, 627 F.2d 375, 378-80, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
National Chamber Alliance for Politics v. FEC, 627 F.2d 375, 378-80, 91 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980) (consolidation and dismissal of both cases for
want of a justiciable case or controversy despite the constitutional claim alleged);
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 591-93 (1957) (emphasizing the importance of a
detailed factual record); Mott v. FEC, 494 F. Supp. 131, 133-35 (D.D.C. 1980)
(district courts need not automatically certify all constitutional claims under § 437h,
especially in the absence of a fully developed factual record or FEC advisory opin-
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FECA allows only corporations and labor organizations to create
PACs. 3 However, corporations and unions obviously do not possess
ion); Gifford v. Congress, 452 F. Supp. 802, 806-10 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that
frivolous constitutional claims should not be certified under § 437h to the court of
appeals sitting en banc). Furthermore, FECA already provides that the FEC may
render advisory opinions. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(7) (Supp. V 1981); see also Martin
Tractor Co. v. FEC, 627 F.2d 375, 384-86, 388-90 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
With regard to the justiciability of the claim, the parties must have a personal
stake in the outcome to attain standing to maintain the suit. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962). The standing of any individual to bring a suit under § 437h is
questionable. See, e.g., Martin Tractor Co. v. FEC, 627 F.2d 375, 378 & n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). In the consolidated cases of Martin Tractor and National Alliance, the
district court held that § 437h was inapplicable to individuals who were not asserting
their rights as voters, 460 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (D.D.C. 1980), but rather, as in the
particular cases, employees of a corporation. The District of Columbia Circuit
refused to intimate a view as to the lower court's holding, but did note its discrepancy
with the decision in Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 591 F.2d 29, 33-34 (7th
Cir. 1979) (holding that the express designation of the three types of plaintiffs eligible
to seek judicial review under § 437h does not act to exclude all others from asserting
standing to bring constitutional challenges under the provision). 627 F.2d at 378.
92. A live case or controversy may be dismissed for prudential reasons, even
when a complaint is governed by 2 U.S.C. § 437h (Supp. V 1981), Clark v. Valeo,
559 F.2d 642, 650 n.ll, 657 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring)
(arguing dismissal of the case entirely on prudential grounds), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Clark v. Kimmit, 431 U.S. 950 (1977); FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Reform
Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 52 (1980) (holding that despite the fact that §
437h is limited to questions of constitutionality, "[i]f a court can decide a case on
non-constitutional grounds, it should not stray into the field of constitutional analy-
sis").
Standing may also be denied as a prudential matter. In Bread Political Action
Committee v. FEC, 591 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit noted that:
[W]ithout their enumeration in § 437h(a), serious questions could be
raised about the standing of each of the specified plaintiffs. The standing
of the Commission to challenge the constitutional validity of the statute it
was created to enforce may have been doubted on the basis of conflicting
case law ...
Congressional doubts about the standing of political parties and voters
may have been based on the fact that challenges to much of the Act by
such plaintiffs might be viewed as asserting either "a 'generalized griev-
ance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens" or the rights of third parties. Such a view might lead to a finding
of no standing under prudential rules.
Id. at 33 n.6.
93. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976).
The 1976 amendments to § 441b, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 492 (1976),
expressly permit membership organizations, cooperatives and corporations without
capital stock to establish separate, segregated funds for political purposes. 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(2)(C) (1976). Previously, it was unsettled as to whether the term "corpora-
tion" was limited to the traditional for-profit corporate entity. See Sproul, supra note
58, at 487.
Some states have also made their election laws applicable to nonprofit corpora-
tions. See, e.g., 1974 Op. N.Y. State Bd. of Elect. No. 5; N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-116
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significant similar characteristics justifying their identical status.
Likewise, for-profit and nonprofit corporations, both of which may
create a PAC, are vastly different. These fundamental distinctions
have surprisingly escaped legislative and judicial recognition.
For example, on the individual level, courts have failed to distin-
guish between shareholders of a for-profit corporation and members
of a nonprofit corporation, and indeed have equated the two groups.9 4
These groups of people should be treated differently, however, for
several reasons." s One reason is that members of a nonprofit corpora-
tion have a greater expectation of privacy.96 In a for-profit corpora-
tion, the shareholders are listed on a public record. Members of a
nonprofit corporation, however, need not be exposed to the public
view.
Second, the nature of the two organizations soliciting the contribu-
tions is entirely different.9 7 In Federal Election Commission v. Na-
tional Right to Work Committee (NRWC),98 a nonprofit corporation
(McKinney 1978) ("The term 'corporation' in section 480 of the former Election Law
of 1949 includes within its meaning not-for-profit corporations .. ").
94. FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 103 S. Ct. 552, 557-58 (1982). The
Supreme Court in that case noted the floor statement of Senator Allen concerning
solicitation of members of a nonprofit corporation:
Mr. President, all this amendment does is to cure an omission in the bill. It
would allow corporations that do not have stock but have a membership
organization, such as a cooperative or other corporation without capital
stock and, hence, without stockholders, to set up separate segregated
political funds as to which it can solicit contributions from its member-
ship; since it does not have any stockholders to solicit, it should be allowed
to solicit its members. That is all that amendment provides. It does cover
an omission in the bill that I believe all agree should be filled.
Id. at 557. The Court construed this statement as suggesting an analogy between
members of a nonstock corporation and stockholders and union members. Id.
95. See generally Hansmann, supra note 66, at 568.
96. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (denying a state the right
to compel disclosure of NAACP's rank-and-file members); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Savola v. Webster, 644 F.2d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1981).
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court implied that if a case
should arise concerning FECA's disclosure requirements and a situation such as in
NAACP, in which the threat to first amendment rights is so serious and the interest
furthered by disclosure so insubstantial, the requirements will not be applied. Id. at
71-74. Such was the situation in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm.,
103 S. Ct. 416 (1982) (holding that the Socialist Workers Party should not be
compelled to disclose the names of its contributors and recipients of its expenditures
because the disclosure would serve to subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals
from government officials or private parties). Importantly, no distinction is made
between members and contributors. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976).
97. See notes 103-05 infra and accompanying text.
98. 103 S. Ct. 552 (1982).
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solicited 267,000 persons for contributions to its PAC." The Supreme
Court found that the NRWC violated restrictive FECA provisions
because it had solicited individuals outside of its authorized class
which was limited to members.100 Although a correct decision in light
of Virginia nonprofit corporation law and the prohibitive nature of
FECA, l0 1 the result appears inequitable. The NRWC had merely
asked contributors to support their organization's cause. No coercion
was exerted on the alleged members who were well aware of what
they were contributing to when they made their pledges.102 Unlike a
for-profit corporation which is organized strictly to channel any fi-
nancial gain back to those who have a share in it, a nonprofit corpora-
tion is organized primarily for public interest and benefit.10 3 An iden-
tifiable ideology and purpose are often apparent which put a
contributor-member on notice of the political sympathies and affilia-
tions of the organization. 0 4
Members of nonprofit corporations voluntarily join because they
agree with the purpose of the corporation in furthering a societal
interest and benefit; they expect no monetary return from their in-
volvement. 105 This knowledge and awareness on the part of the mem-
bers, as opposed to the often obscure shareholder understanding of
political sympathies of the for-profit corporation, l' 6 would appear to
99. Id. at 556.
100. Id. at 558, 561.
101. Id. at 558-61.
102. Id. at 556-57.
103. In National Right to Work Committee, NRWC was organized expressly for
non-pecuniary purposes to inform Americans of the power of labor organizations in
their daily lives. 103 S. Ct. at 555.
Nonprofit corporations are typically created for "charitable, social, political,
trade, professional, recreational, educational, cultural, civic, governmental, reli-
gious and scientific purposes." Note, New York's Not-For-Profit Corporation Law,
47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 768 (1972). For a good discussion of the unique role of the
nonprofit corporation as compared with for-profit corporations, see Hansmann,
supra note 66, at 504-06.
A nonprofit corporation may be organized to make a profit, although the distribu-
tion of the profits to members is prohibited. See note 105 infra and accompanying
text.
104. E.g., National Right to Work Comm., Socialist Workers Party, and the
American Red Cross.
105. E.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CoR'. LAW § 201 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
see Hansmann, supra note 66, at 501, 600-15.
106. Since political sympathies are not a prime factor in the contribution of PAC
funds by a for-profit corporation or a union, see notes 81-83 supra and accompanying
text, patterns of giving evincing PAC philosophy are therefore nonexistent, and do
not increase shareholder understanding.
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create an important distinction between the two groups. Accordingly,
members of nonprofit corporations should not be equated with share-
holders of for-profit corporations; the former group should be unlim-
ited as contributors are volunteers with full knowledge of the solici-
tor's aims and ideals.
More importantly, FECA's arbitrary distinction between for-profit
and nonprofit corporations and unions, and all other entities, dilutes
individual choice and denies the potential for even greater input into
the stream of politics. 107 The structural similarities and potential of
these other groups, such as partnerships, unincorporated associations
and investment firms, to amass large amounts of wealth render their
separation from corporations and labor organizations inexplicable. 108
Because they are considered "persons" under the Act, all entities other
than corporations and unions are subject to the same restrictions as a
single individual.109 Consequently, these groups are effectively pre-
107. See 2 U.S.C § 441b(a) (1976) (expressly identifying corporations and labor
organizations). See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on
Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L.
REV. 148, 163-65 (1974).
108. Comment, supra note 107.
109. California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981). In this case, a not-for-
profit unincorporated association of doctors, the California Medical Association
(CMA), formed a political action committee entitled CALPAC. Id. at 185. However,
because the term "person" under FECA includes unincorporated associations, §
441a(a)(1)(C) restricts CMA's total contribution to CALPAC to $5000. Id. at 185 &
n.2. CMA argued that this restriction was unconstitutional in light of the great
leeway that corporations and unions enjoy to support their separate segregated funds.
Yet unincorporated associations are not permitted to make similar "support" pay-
ments. Id. at 200-01. The Court rejected this equal protection argument, stating that
no discrimination exists because corporations and labor organizations are subject to
many more restrictions than are individuals or unincorporated associations. Such
restrictions include a total ban on direct contributions and the limiting of solicitation
of contributions to the authorized class. Id. at 201.
The Court failed to consider that an unincorporated association such as CMA,
consisting of 25,000 doctors is more analogous to a corporation or union which are
also collectivities of persons, than it is to a single individual. Id. at 201. The discrep-
ancy is rooted in the Court's belief that the restrictions on corporations and labor
organizations are necessarily more burdensome than those imposed on individuals
and other groups. Id. at 200. This conception is superficial, however, in light of the
fact that a PAC is subject to the control of management only, is supported by the
corporation or union, and is unlimited in the aggregate amount of contributions that
it may make in a calendar year. See notes 38-62 & 74-75 supra and accompanying
text. An unincorporated association is limited to $5000 aggregate donation to any one
multicandidate political committee. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1976). This effectively
restrains this unincorporated association's PAC from soliciting outside its class of
members and limits the amount each member could contribute to a pittance. (Here,
$5000 contribution divided by 25,000 members would make twenty cents the maxi-
mum contribution per member). See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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cluded from participating in the political process and the people
affiliated with them are unfairly denied the right to join together
under the guidance of the sponsoring organization to support mutual
interests and ideals. Hence, the present statutory biases work a grave
injustice to our citizens and erode the base of our democratic system.
C. Recommendations: Altering the PAC System
PACs have grown at a remarkable rate since 1974, and the degree
of their influence is unprecedented.110 As a result, pleas to increase
restrictions on PAC contributions' seem unlikely to be heard. 1 2 A
better proposal would be to allow all organizations, not only corpora-
tions and labor organizations, to create PACs. Moreover, restrictions
limiting solicitation of contributions to the PAC to persons within the
authorized class should be eliminated entirely." 13
110. Kenski, supra note 3, at 628. For detailed statistics and discussion of the
explosive growth of PACs, see Adamany, supra note 3, at 588-89; Alexander, supra
note 77, at 654-58; Epstein, The PAC Phenomenon: An Overview, 22 Amz. L. REV.
355, 355-58, 362-64 (1980); Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 605-07; Wright, supra note
2, at 614-15.
111. Adamany, supra note 3, at 597-602 (calling for, inter alia, reduced limits on
individual and aggregate PAC contributions); Mayton, supra note 30, at 386 (calling
for the elimination of salaried employees from corporate solicitation); Wright, supra
note 2, at 643-44 (calling for ceilings on aggregate PAC contributions).
112. This appears particularly true in light of the recent defeat of the Obey-
Railsback bill, which was adopted by the House of Representatives, S. 832, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H9261-9305 (1979) (text at H9289-90), but was
defeated in the Senate.
The Obey-Railsback bill imposed a ceiling on total contributions of all PACs to a
single candidate as well as ceiling amounts that a single PAC could contribute to a
single candidate in primary run-off and general elections. See Adamany, supra note
3, at 598-99.
113. This Note argues for virtually no restrictions or very limited restrictions on
individual campaign spending. In addition, it advocates the promotion of more
effective and beneficial "collection cups," see note 127 infra, by allowing for the
creation of more PACs that may focus their attention on a broader range of persons;
again, this means the lifting of restrictions. This Note does not, however, dispute the
fact that Congress has the right to regulate elections. See FEC v. National Right to
Work Comm., 103 S. Ct. 552, 559 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (congressional authority to regulate primaries);
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) (sovereign power of Congress to
regulate presidential elections); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) (Congress
has the "authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections"); Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657-61 (1884) (the power of Congress to regulate elections
need not be expressly granted in the Constitution); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
383 (1879) (Congress' power over election laws is paramount to state regulations);
United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076
(1973); United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 F. 163, 167 (W.D. Pa.
1916).
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These changes will have significant benefits for the citizen in the
political process. Whereas Congress tried and failed to broaden the
base of individual supporters through the provisions restricting the
total amount of an individual's contribution, 1 4 these proposals would
go a long way toward realizing this goal.
Allowing all types of organizations to create political action com-
mittees would force all PACs and their sponsoring organizations to
compete actively for the support of every individual contributor. In
this competitive environment, each PAC would be forced to disclose
fully the reasons underlying its decision to contribute to certain
causes, candidates and committees."l 5 Just as the candidate or the
party must convince the voting public of the legitimacy and strength
of his or its views, so PACs would have to convince contributors to
support their undertakings. The quality of information concerning
political activities, persons and groups supported by a PAC would be
improved, and PAC tendencies to contribute automatically to incum-
bents would be weakened, if not eliminated." 6 The increased exis-
tence and variety of PACs would afford the individual a greater
choice, thereby making his ultimate contribution more meaningful
and voluntary." 7 Moreover, arbitrary distinctions between organiza-
tions imbedded in the present statutory scheme would be removed.",,
The abolition of restrictions confining solicitation of contributions
to members within the authorized class would also serve to enhance
competition among PACs, and to promote involvement in the political
system by a greater number of individuals. Increased solicitation by
PACs would result in a greater access to information concerning
political matters by a broader base of individuals within the commu-
nity.I" Since all people would then be entitled to question PACs and
their viewpoints, more responsibility would be placed on controlling
officials to account for PAC actions; 20 with this increased disclosure,
the appearance of corruption surrounding PAC activities would be
removed.' 21 The present mystique concerning PAC activities, which
114. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
115. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., H. ALEXANDER & J. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 11-12.
120. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 623-
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not only persons outside but inside the authorized class may sense,122
122. For an illustration of how officials are unwilling to pierce the veil concerning
PAC activities even when the request is made by those who are within the authorized
class of contributors note the following:
'WHEREAS Standard Oil Company of California ("the Corporation") has
established a political action committee (PAC) to facilitate political contri-
butions from employees as permitted by law;
WHEREAS the Corporation bears PAC operation costs and its name and
goodwill are associated with its PAC activities;
WHEREAS some stockholders may regard some PAC activities as not in the
Corporation's best interest and should be informed of the Corporation's
political activities;
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the stockholders respectfully request the
Board of Directors to adopt the following policy:
The Corporation shall disclose in its Annual Report information about
any PAC as follows:
-name(s) of Corporation and subsidiary (as described in 11 CFR par.
100.5(g)(2)(i)(A)) PAC(s);
-PAC officers and persons who select PAC fund recipients, their corpo-
rate jobs and how the persons were selected;
-criteria for recipient selection and amount donated;
-aggregate amounts donated by the Corporation and its subsidiaries
for the current year;
-procedures instituted for compliance with the law including ensuring
voluntary contributions by the individuals solicited;
-total PAC costs for the immediately preceding fiscal year;
A statement in the Annual Report shall inform stockholders that they may
request from the Corporation copies of PAC reports filed with the Federal
Election Commission, texts of PAC solicitation presentations, brief expla-
nations why each donation was in the Corporation's best interest, and any
information listed above relating to PAC(s) of subsidiaries.
My supporting statement is that the Corporation's stockholders are also
voters and citizens who need the information to make intelligent judg-
ments whether an excessive amount of corporate funds is spent on PAC
costs, the extent to which the Corporation should be involved in financing
elections, and whether adequate steps have been taken to ensure against
potential coercion in solicitation, which would be illegal. The Corporation
must guard against distraction of management and employees from per-
forming their work through politicization.'
Recommendation of the Board against the proposal.
The Standard Oil Company of California/Chevron Political Action Com-
mittee has been established pursuant to Federal laws authorizing PAC's.
Neither the Company nor any of its subsidiaries make contributions to the
Socal/Chevron PAC. As permitted by law the Company pays for the
printing, mailing and administration expenses of the Socal/Chevron PAC.
Contributions to the Socal/Chevron PAC are entirely voluntary. Contribu-
tions up to $200 per year are confidential unless the contributor specifies
the candidate for political office to whom his contributions is to be di-
rected, in which case the contributor must be identified in a report filed
with the Federal Election Commission. The only persons solicited for
contributions by the PAC are employee stockholders and annuitant stock-
holders.
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would be dissipated. Furthermore, the judicial review provisions al-
lowing all individuals to lodge complaints with the FEC12 3 and bring
a constitutional challenge as a voter 2 4 would be more appropriate if
all individuals qualify as contributors to all PACs. The difficulties
encountered by the courts in attempting to interpret FECA's vague
definitions regarding those within the authorized class125 also would
be ameliorated.
Most importantly, allowing for the creation of PACs by all organi-
zations and the elimination of restrictions on solicitation of only au-
thorized persons would undoubtedly increase the amount of money
flowing from PACs into the political process.126 This increased avail-
ability of money and consciousness would equalize the chances of all
candidates, whether they be poor or wealthy, newcomer or incum-
bent. 
7
Non-directed contributions to the PAC are distributed to candidates for
political office as determined by the Committee of six employees who
administer the PAC. The Committee files periodic reports with the Fed-
eral Election Commission as required by law.
The cost to the Company to compile and disseminate the information
required by the proposal would far exceed the PAC expenses paid by the
Company and, in the opinion of your Directors, would serve no useful
purpose.
Your Directors recommend that stockholders vote AGAINST the proposal.
Excerpted Jrom STANDARD OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA, NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF
STOCKHOLDERS, MAY 3, 1983, AND PROXY STATEMENT.
123. 2 U.S.C § 437g(a)(8)(C) (Supp. V 1981).
124. Id. § 437h(a).
125. See FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 103 S. Ct. 552 (1982) (determin-
ing the scope of "members" within the authorized class). Some difficulty also exists in
determining who are to be considered stockholders under the Act. For example, no
court has decided whether participants in employee stock ownership plans (ESOP's)
are stockholders for FECA purposes. Vandegrift, The Corporate Political Action
Committee, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 422, 450-52 (1980).
126. This Note proceeds on the assumption that more, not less, money is needed to
provide access to candidates, parties and issues, and to ensure an informed electorate.
The essence of the problem is summed up in the thought that American
politics has failed to provide the motivation to find or develop effective
collection cups for sufficient numbers of conscientious citizens who per-
haps might learn to donate money to politics if properly approached. The
importance of small contributions in a democracy warrants the time,
effort, energy and investment to iound them up in large numbers.
H. ALEXANDER & J. MOLLOY, supra note 3, at 16. Presently, PACs have increased the
amount of money available for politics. Adamany, supra note 3, at 589. The allow-
ance for more PACs, however, will provide even more "collection cups" and thus,
more money.
127. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. Benjamin Franklin once wrote,
"the all of one man is as dear to him as the all of another ... the poor man has an
equal right but the more need to have representatives in the legislature than the rich
one." Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 205, 206
FEDERAL ELECTION LAW
IV. Conclusion
The importance of the electoral process has traditionally been
viewed by Congress as creating the need for heavy regulation to insure
its strength and vitality. However, when practical application of
FECA campaign contribution restrictions results in subordinating the
rights of the individual to the rights of numerous special interest
collectivities, clearly the Congress should reconsider its methods.
PAC power and influence has emerged recently as a significant
factor in the American political system at the expense of individuals,
candidates and political parties. Undeniably, PACs do serve a justifi-
able purpose as a source of funds sorely needed to allow candidates to
reach the greatest number of prospective voters. Also, at least theoreti-
cally, PACs are created to solicit small contributions from individual
citizens, thus promoting individual participation and access to the
political system. Yet, these positive characteristics of PACs, although
recognized, remain largely untapped. Congress should realize the
potential which PACs offer as instruments for attaining a more well-
informed electorate and a political system responsive to the needs and
ideas of the individual citizen. The current arbitrary restrictions on
the creation of PACs and the solicitation of individuals should be
abandoned in order to foster the proliferation of PACs and channel
PAC energies and funds toward a greater number of people. Addition-
ally, individuals and groups other than corporations or labor organi-
zations must be given at least an equal status to that of PACs to
alleviate the tension between the competing interests. Finally, restric-
tions on individual rights to contribute should be abolished or at a
minimum curtailed absent a more compelling government interest in
denying these rights.
Susan H. Marren
(1964). James Madison expressed the similar view of political equality for all individ-
uals in THE FEDERALIST No. 57:
Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the rich,
more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of
obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body
of people of the United States ....
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit
may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No
qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith or of civil profession is
permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the
people.
Id. (quoted in Wright, supra note 2, at 626).
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